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resumo Este artigo apresenta um objetivo duplo: considerar detalhadamente as objeções
contra a concepção existencialista do conteúdo da experiência visual e desenvolver e
defender uma versão dela que evite tais objeções, solucionando, especificamente, o dito
“problema da particularidade”. A tese principal é de que o conteúdo existencial da expe-
riência visual deve ser compreendido como relativizado, sendo conteúdo incompleto (em
vez de um clássico, de proposições completas), modelado como uma função do sêxtuplo do
objeto, agente, tempo, lugar, relação causal, e mundo para valores absolutos.
palavras-chave Conteúdo existencial da percepção; conteúdo relativizado; problema da
particularidade.
Introduction
It used to be a common ground that the content of visual experience
involves the very properties things appear to have, but do not involve the
very objects that appear to have them.This content is said to be an exis-
tentially quantified proposition, which would naturally be expressed by
saying something of the form,“There is a yellow cube straight ahead.”
One reason sometimes given in support of the existentialist view is that
the object does not seem to contribute to the phenomenology of expe-
rience. Experiences with the same phenomenal character can represent
the world in the same way, even if they are experiences of numerically
different objects. Another reason sometimes given in favor of the exis-
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tentialist view is that experiences can represent the world as being the
same way, even if an experience is a hallucination in which no object is
perceived at all.
The existentialist view figures prominently in the work of thinkers as
different as Lewis (1980), McGinn (1982), Searle (1983), Millar (1rela-
tivized 991), and Davies (1992). However, in the last decade, the existen-
tialist view on the content of visual experience has been questioned on
several grounds. Soteriou (2000) claims that one must reject the existen-
tialist view if one rejects the assumption that visual experiences represent
a causal relation between an object and the experience itself and if one
accepts the natural assumption—what he calls Searle’s assumption—that
the question of veridicality of experience cannot be settled independently
of the question of whether an object is being perceived.
Tye, on the other hand, claims that the existentialist view “lacks a clear
motivation” (2009, p. 79). Furthermore, he rejects not only the assump-
tion that visual experiences represent a causal relation between an object
and the experience itself, but also Searle’s assumption.According to Tye,
the existentialist view must be rejected because “it yields an unequivocal
result of veridicality in certain cases in which such a result is not warrant-
ed” (2009, p. 79).
The crucial difficulty of the existentialist view can be traced back to
what Searle in the eighties called the particularity problem. As we saw,
one of the reasons motivating the existentialist view is that the object
does not seem to contribute to the phenomenology of experience. Expe-
riences with the same phenomenology can represent the world in the
same way, even if they are experiences of numerically different objects.
According to Searle, however,“we have intentional contents with partic-
ular and not general conditions of satisfaction” (SEARLE, 1983, p. 63).
Thus, the condition of satisfaction in a visual experience of a yellow cube
straight ahead requires the presence of the yellow cube straight ahead and
not the presence of any qualitatively identical object.
The aim of this paper is twofold: to consider in detail the objections
against the existentialist view on the content of visual experience and to
develop and defend a version of it that avoids these objections, solving, in
particular, the so-called “particularity problem.” I will argue that most
objections to the existentialist view are objections only against its origi-
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nal formulation (McGinn and Davies) and against Searle’s more elaborate
causal version.The existentialist can avoid these objections by assuming
that the existential content of visual experience takes the form of rela-
tivized content (rather than a classical proposition), modeled as a propo-
sitional function from the sextuple of object, agent, time, location, causal
relation, and world to truth-values. In this sense, the content of experi-
ence corresponds to the content of a predicate rather than that of a
complete sentence.
Against Soteriou’s argument, I claim that the rejection of the existen-
tialist view does not necessarily follow from the acceptance of Searle’s so-
called assumption that the question of veridicality of experience cannot
be settled independently of the question of whether an object is being
perceived and the rejection of Searle’s causal version of the existentialist
view. If the causal relation does not belong to the content of experience
itself, it can be seen as belonging to the rich circumstances of evaluation
against which the content is meant be evaluated.
Against Tye, I claim that the existentialist view can also solve the prob-
lem of particularity, albeit not in the original way suggested by Searle.
Visual experience has a general content rather than an object-involving
content. However, to count as the content of a visual experience that
general content must be true of the particular object located in the perceiver’s
visual field at the time the mental state occurs that is causally responsible for that
mental state in the actual world.Therefore, even though the object does not
belong to the representational content itself, the experience is only satis-
fied by its presence and not by the presence of any other qualitatively
identical object.
The existentialist view
Among the recent literature, the first to support the existentialist view
was the work of McGinn (1982).According to him, the content of visu-
al experience could not be specified by the employment of singular
terms (like demonstratives), that is, “terms that refer to the object of
experience” (1982, p. 51).An accurate description of the content of visu-
al experience should employ only general terms (this is what McGinn
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calls the “generality thesis”).Therefore, the content of my visual experi-
ence, say, of a yellow cube straight ahead, represents the world as contain-
ing a or some yellow cube straight ahead rather than this or that cube in
particular.There are, or could be, many cubes in the world which equal-
ly “fit” the content of an experience of a yellow cube straight ahead;
hence, the content of experience does not constitute or establish the rela-
tion to a particular perceptual object (1982, p. 50).
However, Davies was the first to explicitly state the existentialist view:
If perceptual content is phenomenological content then, it seems, it is
not object-involving. But from this it does not follow that perceptual
content is not truth conditional-not fully representational; for we can
take perceptual content to be existentially quantified content.A visual
experience may present the world as containing an object of a certain
size and shape, in a certain direction, at a certain distance from the
subject. It matters not at all to that existentially quantified content of a
subject's experience whether, for example, it is Fido or Fifi that she is
looking at. (DAVIES, 1992, p. 26)
According to the existentialist view, the representational content of expe-
rience takes the canonical form of an existential, quantified proposition.
My visual experience of a yellow cube straight ahead represents a yellow
cube straight ahead rather than this or that yellow cube straight ahead.
Assuming a Russellian view on the nature of propositions, the content of
visual experience is property-involving, but not “object-involving.”The
objects of our visual experience are not constituents of the representa-
tional content of experience. In other words, the content of visual expe-
rience is best modeled as a general Russellian proposition rather than as
a singular Russellian proposition.
The existentialist view has two motivations. First, if content of visual
experience is phenomenological content, as Davies claims, and if the
object and any other particular do not contribute to the phenomenolo-
gy of experience, then visual experiences with the same phenomenal
character can represent the world as being the same way, even if they are
experiences of numerically different objects.Therefore, the content of
experience is not to be specified by using singular terms, “on pain of
denying that distinct objects can seem precisely the same” (McGINN,
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1982, p. 51). Now, under the Russellian view on the nature of proposi-
tions (as contents consisting of entities rather than of modes of presenta-
tion), the content of experience cannot be singular or object-involving.
Another reason in favor of the existentialist view is that experiences
can represent the world as being the same way, even if one of them is a
hallucination in which no object is perceived at all.Therefore, without
the need to ascribe to the visual experience of different levels of content
as concurrent views, the existentialist view can easily accommodate the
intuitions (i) that hallucinatory experiences may have the same content
of certain normal experiences (either veridical or illusory) and further (ii)
that such content is in fact illusory (or neither veridical nor illusory).
Both my visual experience and my hallucinatory experience of a yellow
cube project the same accuracy conditions on the world, modeled as the
existential proposition that there is a yellow cube straight ahead.They
both represent the world exactly in the same way, viz., as containing a
yellow cube straight ahead. My experience is veridical when there is in
fact a yellow cube straight ahead. It is illusory either when the cube
straight ahead is not yellow or when the yellowish thing straight ahead in
my visual field is not cubic. Further, it is hallucinatory when there is
simply no object of the relevant sort in my visual field.
In the literature, the claim that that the content of visual experience
and the objects of experience are mutually independent is further
supported by an appeal to two well-known scenarios.There are cases in
which we want to say that the content of experience is accurate even
though the experience is illusory, and there are cases where we want to
say that the content of experience is accurate even though the experience
is hallucinatory. In both types of cases, the object represented in the
content of experience is not the object perceived. Following the literature,
let us call the first scenarios cases of veridical misperceptions (SOTERIOU,
2000) and the second scenarios cases of veridical hallucinations
(LEWIS, 1980).
A simple case of misperception occurs when a subject perceives an
object as having some property or properties that, in fact, it lacks. Now,
adapting a scenario suggested by Soteriou as our example (2000, p. 180),
let us suppose that, due to the fact that the perceiver is wearing displac-
ing glasses, she perceives a yellow cube straight ahead of her which in fact
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is to her left. In this case, the subject misperceives the object, since her
visual experience places the yellow cube in the incorrect location.
Further, let’s assume that there is in fact a second yellow cube straight
ahead of the perceiver, and that it seems to the perceiver that this second
yellow cube is located to her right where, in fact, there is a third qualita-
tively identical yellow cube that is too far to the right of the subject to be
perceived. Under the assumption that the content of experience is best
modeled as an existential proposition, the content of experience in this
case seems to be accurate; after all, there is a yellow cube straight ahead as
the experience represents it to be. Nevertheless, the experience itself is
illusory since the yellow cube that is seen is not straight ahead of the
perceiver, but to her right.
According to Soteriou, the case can be suitably amended, so that the
perceiver may also misperceive other aspects of her environment even
though the content of her experience remains accurate.Tye provided an
interesting example of this:
Suppose that I am looking directly ahead and that, unknown to me,
there is a mirror in front of me placed at a 45° angle, and behind
which there is a yellow cube. Off to the right of the mirror, and
reflected in it, is a white cube.Through special lighting conditions, this
cube appears yellow to me. (2009, p. 79)
Under the assumption that the content of my experience is best modeled
as an existential quantified proposition, the content of experience in this
case seems to be veridical; after all, the world appears to me as my visual
experience represents it to be, since there is in fact a yellow cube straight
ahead. Nonetheless, my visual experience is clearly illusory, since I do not
see the yellow cube that is in fact straight ahead of me as my visual expe-
rience represents it to be, since that cube is behind the mirror outside my
visual field. Rather, what I see is the image of another white cube reflect-
ed on the mirror placed at a 45° angle, which appears to be yellow
because of special lighting conditions.Thus, while my experience is illu-
sory, the content of my experience is veridical or accurate.1
Scenarios of veridical hallucinations are also supposed to establish the
claim that there can be cases where the content of experience is veridi-
cal – the world fully matches the content of experience – and yet no
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object is perceived. Let us suppose there is a yellow cube in front of me.
However, unbeknownst to me, the information reflected in the light
from the cube and reaching my retina is processed no further. An evil
neuroscientist (or a Cartesian demon, if you will) has blocked the signals
from my retina to my optic nerve, while simultaneously activating my
visual cortex by means of electrical probes that work in the same way as
neurological signals. Under these circumstances, I neither perceive nor
misperceive the yellow cube for the simple reason that I do not see the
yellow cube straight ahead of me in the first place. My experience is
hallucinatory. Nonetheless, the content of my visual experience seems to
be accurate; after all, there is a yellow cube straight ahead of me as my
visual experience represents there to be.
Thus, our recognition of cases of veridical misperceptions and cases of
veridical hallucinations is supposed to support the claim that content and
object are mutually independent: we cannot deduce the content of an
experience from knowledge of its object; and we cannot deduce the
identity of the object of a visual experience from knowledge of its
content (McGINN, 1982).The question of the veridicality of experience
must be settled independently of the question of whether the object is
perceived.The content of experience is veridical when there are partic-
ulars in the world that possess all of the properties specified by the
content, irrespective of whether or not those particulars are experienced.
Searle’s conjunctive account 
As we saw, one of the reasons given in support of the existentialist view
is the fact that the object does not contribute to the phenomenology of
experience.Visual experiences may have the same phenomenal character,
even if they are experiences of numerically different objects.According
to Searle 
But a problem immediately arises that we have not yet faced: we have
discussed the case where a person sees that a yellow wagon is in front of
him, but what about the case where he sees that a particular, previously
identified, yellow station wagon is in front of him.When, for example, I
see my own station wagon, the conditions of satisfaction require not
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merely that there be some station wagon or other satisfying my
Intentional content, but rather that it be my very own. Now the question
is; how does this particularity get into the Intentional content of the
perception? Let us call this “the problem of particularity.” (1983, p. 62)
Following Searle, let us suppose that there is the twin of our earth in a
distant galaxy, one that is identical to our earth down to the last
microparticle. Suppose further that, while on our earth Jones sees a
yellow cube straight ahead, on the twin-earth, Jones’ twin also sees a
yellow cube straight ahead that is qualitatively identical to the yellow
cube seen by Jones.The point is that the particular object to which the
perceiver is perceptually related makes a constitutive difference to the
representational content of visual experience.The accuracy condition of
each perceiver’s experience must be sensitive to which particular object
is perceived. Jones’s visual experience cannot be accurate only because
there is in fact a yellow cube straight ahead of him. Rather, Jones’s expe-
rience can only be accurate if the cube he is seeing straight ahead of him
is yellow (and not any other qualitatively identical particular). If another
qualitatively indistinguishable cube replaces the yellow cube straight
ahead of Jones, then the accuracy conditions of Jones’s visual experience
change even if he cannot tell the two cubes apart.Therefore, there must
be something wrong with the existentialist view.
To solve the problem of particularity, Searle has to make the existential
content more elaborate. In his improvement of the existentialist view, the
content of visual experience is specified by a conjunction. My visual expe-
rience of the yellow cube is veridical or accurate if (i) there is a yellow cube
in my visual field, and if (ii) the fact that there is a yellow cube is causally
responsible for my visual experience (1983, p. 123). In this view, veridical
misperception and veridical hallucinations are in fact sheer cases of illusory
experience, because there is no appropriate causal relation between the
object and the mental state that represents it. If the yellow cube straight
ahead is not causally responsible for my mental state representing a yellow
cube straight ahead (either because the yellow cube straight ahead is behind
the mirror and the cube I see is white in color, or because I am undergoing
a hallucinatory experience), the representational content of my experience
cannot possibly be veridical even if the world is as it appears to me to be.
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However, Searle’s idea of making the causal self-referential condition
part of the content of experience was rejected by numerous critics. A
common complaint is that the idea is phenomenally inadequate.Accord-
ing to Tye,“the proposal (. . .) is not easy to swallow. Intuitively, when I see
a tomato, for example, my visual experience is directed upon the tomato.
It is not about itself in addition to the tomato” (2009, p. 80).When we
undergo the visual experience of a yellow cube straight ahead, it does not
seem to us as if we are aware of the causal relation between the apparent
object and our experience. According to Burge, the self-referentiality
required by the conjunctive account is simply “too complex or too
sophisticated” (BURGE, 1991, p. 198). It is cognitively too demanding to
assume that every perceiver has the conceptual resources required to refer
to her own token experience as caused by the fact it represents.
Under the assumption that the causal relation belongs to the repre-
sentational content of experience and that the perceiver has knowledge
of it, Searle’s account of reference seems to be inherently descriptivist
(BACH, 2007). If the causal relation belongs to the content of experi-
ence, the reference is determined satisfactionally rather than relationally
(see BACH, 1987); in other words, the reference is not determined by
the blind fact that the apparent object is causally responsible for the
perceiver’s experience, but rather by the perceiver’s propositional knowledge
of that fact.The reference of my experience to the yellow cube is not
determined by the blind fact that the particular is causally responsible for
my experience, but rather by my knowledge of that causal relation.
Therefore, under the assumption that the causal relation belongs to
the content of experience and that the perceiver has knowledge of that
relation, the conjunctive account cannot solve the particularity problem.
In Searle’s conjunctive account, the content of my visual experience of a
yellow cube is not satisfied by that particular I am seeing, but rather by
whatever particular satisfies the identifying condition of being the particu-
lar located in my visual field, which, at the time my mental state occurs,
is causally responsible for that state.
However, against such charges, Searle insists that
[t]he agent need have no ‘knowledge of the causal relation’.The causal
feature is simply a feature of the content of the unreflective visual
experience. (1991, p. 234)
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In defense of Searle’s account, one might reasonably sustain that the
causal self-referential component can be part of the content of the
perceiver’s experience even if the perceiver does not possess the causal,
self-referential concepts required to provide a canonical specification
of that content.To hold that the perceiver need have no knowledge of
the causal relation is to hold that she represents the causal self-referential
condition nonconceptually. However, I am inclined to side with Soteriou
when he claims that “even if we accept that experience can have a
non-conceptual content we still need to maintain that the content that
we ascribe to a subject should serve some explanatory purpose” (2000,
p. 182). Now, there are no discriminatory abilities left unexplained if
one does not endorse Searle’s conjunctive account by including the
causal self-referential condition in the representational content of visu-
al experience.
However, in his Intentionality, Searle further claims that the causal self-
referential condition could be part of the representational content of
visual experience even if the perceiver does not see the causal relation:
Furthermore, when I say that the visual experience is causally self-
referential I do not mean that the causal relation is seen, much less that
the visual experience is seen. Rather what is seen are objects and states
of affairs (. . .). (1983, p. 49)
Intuitively, if we assume that we do not even see the causal relation, we
have no reason to endorse Searle’s claim that this relation is part of the
content of experience, even under the assumption that such content is
nonconceptual.
Searle’s assumption
According to Tye, Searle’s causal version of the existentialist view should
be rejected because “it yields an unequivocal result” in certain cases in
which such a result is not warranted (2009, p. 79).These are the discussed
cases of veridical misperceptions and veridical hallucinations.The causal
version of the existentialist thesis cannot accommodate cases of veridical
hallucinations because
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[a]ccording to that thesis, there can be no such thing as a veridical
hallucination, since when an hallucination is present, there is no object
of the relevant sort in the scene before the subject’s causing his or her
experience.Thus, every hallucination must be counted as falsidical. This
obviously will not do. (2009, p. 2009, my emphasis)
The causal version of the existential thesis yields the unequivocal result
that cases of veridical hallucinations must be counted as falsidical.The
same criticism applies to cases of veridical misperceptions, since Searle’s
conjunctive account cannot allow the possibility of such a thing as a
veridical misperception. Remember Tye’s example of veridical misper-
ception? If the yellow cube represented by my visual experience as being
straight ahead is in fact behind the mirror and hence is not causally
responsible for my visual experience of a yellow cube straight ahead – the
cube causing my visual experience is white in color and only appears to
me as yellow owing to the special lighting conditions of the environment
– then the existential content must be counted as falsidical simpliciter.2
The underlying assumption of Searle’s conjunctive account is that the
question of whether the content of experience is veridical cannot be
settled independently of the question of whether the represented object
is the object perceived. Following Soteriou, we may call this Searle’s
assumption (2000, p. 176).
However, Searle’s assumption is independent of Searle’s conjunctive
account of the content of experience. In other words, even if one is
hostile to the idea of making the causal relation part of the content of
experience, one may still have reasons to endorse Searle’s assumption.
According to Burge,
[i]t is not enough for the satisfaction of the intentional state that there
be some entity in the vicinity that has the visible properties presented
by experience (. . .).The intentional must itself somehow reflect the
causal condition of its satisfaction. Searle emphasizes this point and is
entirely right to do so. (1991, pp. 201-202)
As Soteriou remarks (2000, p. 177), Burge believes that we can discard
Searle’s idea that the causal relation belongs to the representational
content of experience, yet retain Searle’s assumption alone by intro-
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ducing a demonstrative element to the representational content of
experience:
By including a demonstrative element in the content of visual
experience (. . .) one may reflect in the intentional content the
condition that to be veridical the experience must be caused by an
entity that is (say) F.An account of the semantic or intentional nature of
the visual demonstrative should require that the demonstrative fails to
apply to anything unless the experience is appropriately caused. (1991,
p. 202)
In this way, the content of visual experience takes the predicative form
“that F é G” (consisting of a demonstrative element “that F” and of an
attributive element “G”) rather than the existential form (an F that is G).
According to Burge, when the visual experience is not appropriately
caused, the demonstrative element “that F” fails to apply. Burge’s sugges-
tion applies nicely to simple cases of hallucination, such as cases of failed
demonstrations. When the subject is experiencing hallucination, no
object of the relevant sort in the scene before the subject is causally
responsible for his or her hallucinatory experience, and hence the
demonstrative element “that F” fails to apply. Nevertheless, in the same
way that a failed demonstration still has a representational sort of content,
insofar as it still has a character or linguistic meaning, as a failed demon-
stration, the hallucinatory experience still has representational content.
However, the suggestion cannot apply to cases of veridical misper-
ceptions and veridical hallucinations. For one thing, if there is in fact a
yellow cube straight ahead of me, regardless of whether or not I am
really seeing it, I may successfully refer to it in the demonstrative way
suggested by Burge: that cube straight ahead is yellow (that F is G) and
the content of my experience must count as accurate. Therefore, the
demonstrative element “that cube” cannot replace the role of the causal
relation – “the cube that is causally responsible for this visual experi-
ence” – in Searle’s conjunctive account of the content of visual experi-
ence.The inclusion of a demonstrative element in the representational
content of visual experience cannot explain why cases of veridical
misperceptions and veridical hallucinations are falsidical simpliciter, as
Searle’s assumption requires.
74
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 9, n. 2, p.63-88, outubro, 2012
As Soteriou remarks, neither Burge nor Searle provide a supporting
argument for Searle’s assumption (2000, p. 178).Thus, the crucial ques-
tion is whether we have an independent reason to assume that an expe-
rience cannot be veridical unless the object represented is the object
perceived. Soteriou provides an argument in support of Searle’s assump-
tion. In a nutshell,
[i]f one allows the possibility of veridical misperception, then one must
give up the following assumption: if some part of the subject’s
environment is different from the way it is represented to be, then at
least one of the conditions required for the content of representation
to be correct is not satisfied. (2000, p. 180; my emphasis)
However, unless we assume that the causal relation itself is represented by
visual experience, strictly speaking, there is nothing in the subject’s envi-
ronment that “is different from the way it is represented to be” in case of
veridical misperception.When I am undergoing the veridical mispercep-
tion of a yellow cube straight ahead, my experience represents only the
proposition that there is a yellow cube straight ahead and not the addi-
tional fact that the yellow cube straight ahead is causally responsible for
my visual experience. Now if, as matter of fact, there is a yellow cube
straight ahead, there is nothing in my environment different from the
way it is represented by my visual experience.
Soteriou’s insight is better captured by means of the Kaplanian notion
of circumstance of evaluation.According to Kaplan, semantic content is
true or false not only at worlds, but also relative to times, standards of
precision, and locations – the so-called circumstance of evaluation.What
goes into the circumstance of evaluation is determined by “the amount
of information linked to the degree of specificity of contents, and thus to
the kinds of operators in the language” (1989, p. 502). Natural languages
contain modal, temporal, and, maybe, locational operators. For that
reason, worlds and temporal and place-neutral contents are meant to be
evaluated in terms of worlds, times, and locations.
In analogy with the operators of natural languages, we may think of
perception or visual experience as a determining factor of the circum-
stances against which the content of experience is meant to be evaluated
(we shall develop this idea in the following sections). In this sense, what
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goes into this circumstance of evaluation is determined by what counts
as a perception or as a visual experience. For example, for a mental state
representing the existential proposition that there is a yellow cube
straight ahead to count as a visual experience, (i) there must be a yellow cube
straight ahead, (ii) located in my egocentric visual field, (iii) at the time
my mental state occurs, and (iv) causally responsible for that mental state
in the appropriate way. If my mental state is caused by some event in the
past, it must be counted as a memory or imagination rather than as a
visual experience. Likewise, if that mental state is not caused in the
appropriate way by the cube in my visual field, it cannot be counted as a
visual experience of the cube.
Now, we have a better defense of Searle’s assumption.To be sure, my
mental state of a yellow cube straight ahead does not represent the further
fact that the existence of the yellow cube straight ahead is causally respon-
sible for that mental state. Moreover, there is nothing in the representa-
tional content itself that can replace or reflect the role that the causal rela-
tion plays in Searle’s account (Burge’s suggestion).Nevertheless, that causal
relation must be seen as part of the rich circumstances against which that
content is meant to be evaluated if that mental state is to be counted as a
visual experience. Even though my visual experience represents only a
yellow cube straight ahead, it can be accurate or veridical only if the fact
that there is a yellow cube straight ahead is causally responsible for my
mental state.Thus, the question as to whether the experience is veridical
cannot be settled independently of the question of whether the repre-
sented object is the object perceived (Searle’s assumption).
Impure existential contents
Now, the accuracy condition of visual experience is sensitive not only to
the particular object to which the perceiver is perceptually related but
also to several other parameters.To begin with, the accuracy condition of
visual experience is sensitive to the time the experience or the mental
states occur. Suppose that, at 2 p.m., there is a yellow cube straight ahead,
whereas at 2:10 p.m. the cube is removed from my visual field. Suppose,
in addition, that my visual experiences at 2 p.m. and at 2:10 p.m. equally
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represent the timeless existential proposition that there is a yellow cube
straight ahead. Intuitively, if my first experience is accurate, my second
visual experience is clearly falsidical. However, under the assumption that
existential contents are timeless, we must say that the second content is
also accurate; after all, if there is no yellow cube straight ahead now, there
was one ten minutes earlier.
The natural way out is to incorporate the time the experience occurs
into the existential content of visual experience. In the former case, my
visual experience represents a yellow cube straight ahead at 2 p.m.,
whereas in the second case, it represents a yellow cube straight ahead at
2:10 p.m.Thus, by relating the time the mental state occurs to existential
content, the content of the first experience turns out to be accurate,
while that of the second experience turns out to be falsidical. Now,
however, according to Tye, the existential content of visual experience is
“no longer pure: it includes a particular time” (2009, p. 90).
The accuracy condition of visual experience is also sensitive to the
location of the object (in the perceiver’s egocentric visual field). Suppose
now that there is a yellow cube straight ahead in Lithuania even though
there is no yellow cube anywhere else. Intuitively, if I am in Lithuania
and the yellow cube straight ahead is in my egocentric visual field, the
existential content of my visual experience turns out to be accurate.
However, if I am in Rio and the yellow cube straight ahead is not in my
visual field, the existential content of my visual experience must be inac-
curate. However, under the assumption that existential contents are local-
neutral, we must say that the second existential content is also accurate;
after all, if there is no yellow cube straight ahead in my visual field, there
is one in Lithuania.
The natural way out is to incorporate the location of the object into
the existential content of visual experience. In the former case, what
visual experience represents is that there is a yellow cube somewhere in
Lithuania, whereas in the second case, visual experience represents a
different existential content, namely, that there is a yellow cube straight
ahead in Rio. Once more, the existential content of visual experience is
no longer pure; rather, it is party singular.
Moreover, the accuracy condition of visual experience is also sensitive
to the person undergoing the visual experience. Suppose now that there
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is a yellow cube straight ahead of someone else even though there is no
yellow cube straight ahead of me. Intuitively, if I am the perceiver, the
content of my experience is clearly falsidical. However, under the
assumption that the existential content is person-neutral, that content
turns out to be accurate too.
The natural way out is to incorporate the perceiver herself into the
content of visual experience.What my visual experience represents is that
there is a yellow cube straight ahead of me.Therefore, the content of my
experience is unequivocally inaccurate. Nevertheless, the above difficul-
ty recurs. The existential content of visual experience turns out to be
impure or partly singular.
The relativized content of experience 
However, to solve the particularity problem, the existentialist does not
need to incorporate the location of the object, the time, or the perceiver
into the content of experience (for the same reason, he neither needs to
incorporate the object nor its causal relation into that content).Accord-
ing to a proposal inspired by Kaplan’s idea that circumstances of evalu-
ation are determined by operators of natural language, all we need to do
is think of (i) the object, (ii) its location, (iii) the time, (iv) the perceiver,
and (iv) the fact that the object is as causally responsible for the mental
state as crucial parameters of the rich circumstance of evaluation deter-
mined by the fact that that mental state in question is a visual experience.
This proposal is based on Recanati’s insightful assessment of Searle’s
account (RECANATI, 2007). Recanati’s first step toward clarifying the
content of visual experience is restating Searle’s distinction between
psychological mode and representational content. Searle emphasized the
similarity between speech acts and mental states such as belief. Both have
a dual structure: content and mode. The “psychological mode” corre-
sponds, on the side of mental states, to the illocutionary force on the side
of speech acts.To say “there is a yellow cube straight ahead” is to perform
a speech act whose content is the proposition that there is a yellow cube
straight ahead and whose force is that of an assertion. Likewise, to believe
the sentence “there is a yellow cube straight ahead” is to be in a doxastic
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state whose content is the same as the proposition that there is a yellow
cube straight ahead and whose psychological mode (propositional atti-
tude) is that of belief.
Now, the same dual structure between psychological mode and
content can be generalized. According to Searle, the same representa-
tional content can be entertained in various distinct psychological states.
In Searle’s account, psychological modes are the different specific rela-
tions a subject has to the same proposition, that is, the different specific
ways that the same content is entertained that then turn the mental state
into a specific kind of state.Thus, it is, for example, possible to see a yellow
cube straight ahead, to desire a yellow cube straight ahead, and to think of a
yellow cube straight ahead. In these various cases, the contents remain the
same, whereas the psychological modes vary. In the first case, the psycho-
logical mode is that of a visual experience; in the second, it is that of a
desire; and, in the third, it is that of a thought.
However, in opposition to beliefs, desires and illusory states, and hallu-
cinations, visual experience (perception) like memory and knowledge is
a factive attitude: one only perceives or sees that there is a yellow cube
straight ahead if in fact there is a yellow cube straight ahead. In other
words, for an experience of a yellow cube straight ahead to count as a
visual experience or as a perception, there must be a yellow cube straight
ahead.Thus, if psychological modes or propositional attitudes are rela-
tions of subjects to propositions, perception (visual experience) is a
mental relation to true propositions.
Nevertheless, this is not enough. For a mental state representing the
existential proposition that there is a yellow cube straight ahead to count as
a visual experience, the existing yellow cube straight ahead represented by the
mental state must be causally responsible for the mental state itself in the
appropriate way. For this reason, the causal relation (self-referential condi-
tion) that figures in Searle’s analysis is determined by the perceptual mode
rather than by the content itself (RECANATI 2007, pp. 131-132).Thus,
contrary to what the conjunctive account holds, the visual experience of a
yellow cube represents only the proposition that there is a yellow cube
straight ahead. The causal relation belongs to the circumstance against
which that content is meant to be evaluated rather than to the content
itself, if that mental state is to be counted as a visual experience.
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Now the same reasoning applies to the other parameters: (i) the loca-
tion of the object, (ii) the time, and (iii) the perceiver herself.To begin
with, for a mental state representing the proposition that there is a yellow
cube straight ahead to count as a visual experience, it must be the case that
the mental state in question is caused by something that occurs at the
time that the mental state in question occurs. If the mental state repre-
sents the same proposition but is caused by some past event, it must count
as a memory or as imagination rather than as a perception or visual expe-
rience. Thus, for a mental state representing at 2 p.m. that there is a
yellow cube straight ahead to count as a visual experience, it must be
caused by something at 2 p.m. However, as before, the time itself is not
represented, and thus, it is not part of the representational content itself.
Rather, it belongs to the rich circumstances against which the content is
meant to be evaluated.
Secondly, for a mental state representing a content to count as a visual
experience, the object represented must be located in the perceiver’s visu-
al field. For a mental state representing that there is a yellow cube straight
ahead to count as a visual experience, the yellow cube must be located in
the perceiver’s visual field. Intuitively, I cannot see a yellow cube straight
ahead if the cube is in Lithuania and I am in Rio, but, as before, the fact
that the object must be located in the perceiver’s visual field is not part of
the content itself. Rather, it is part of the rich circumstances against
which that content is meant to be evaluated.
Thirdly and lastly, for a mental state representing the proposition that
there is a yellow cube straight ahead to count as a visual experience, it must
be the case that the mental state in question belongs to the very subject
located at the center of the visual field (the perceiver). If the mental state
represents that same proposition, but belongs to someone else outside the
visual field, it cannot be counted as a visual experience. Nonetheless, as
before, the perceiver’s position is not part of the content itself. My visual
experience represents a yellow cube straight ahead and not that there is a
yellow cube straight ahead of me. If the psychological mode of that
content is to count as visual experience, the perceiver is part of the rich
circumstances against which that content is meant to be evaluated.
We can now summarize all conditions in the following terms: for a
mental state representing the content that there is a yellow cube straight
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ahead to count as visual experience (i) there must be a yellow cube
straight ahead, (ii) located in the perceiver’s visual field, (iii) at the time
the mental state occurs, and (iv) causally responsible for that mental state.
All these parameters belong to the rich circumstances of evaluation
rather than to the content itself.
Classical propositions are contents that have a truth-value relative only
to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance “there is a
yellow cube straight ahead of Peter at 2 p.m.” is true just in the case that
there is a yellow cube straight ahead of Peter at 2 p.m. in the actual
world, and the content of my belief that “Peter is seeing a yellow cube
straight ahead of him at 2 p.m.” is true just in the case that Peter is seeing
a yellow cube straight ahead of him at 2 p.m. in the actual world.
However, not all content takes the form of a classical proposition.
Indeed, some relativistic contents possess a truth-value not only relative
to a world, but also relative to a time, a person, and other parameters.
Visual experience is the case in point. My experience represents that
there is a yellow cube straight ahead. However, as we saw above, that
proposition is incomplete in the light of the standard semantics. It is an
object, agent, time, location, and world-neutral content that is true only
relative to the rich circumstances of evaluation. Thus, the content of
experience corresponds to the content of a predicate rather than to that
of a complete sentence that is true only of the particular object located in the
perceiver’s visual field at the time the mental state occurs that is causally responsi-
ble for that mental state in the actual world – that is, the content of experi-
ence is a complex property that, in Lewis’s jargon, the subject self-ascribes.
Therefore, such incomplete content is best modeled as a function
from the sextuple of object, agent, time, location, causal relation, and
world to truth-values. Thus, in the case of my visual experience of a
yellow cube straight ahead, we have the following: when the object is the
yellow cube, the time is the time at which my experience occurs; the
location of the cube is in my visual field straight ahead of me (as the
agent); the cube is causally responsible for my experience and the world
is the actual world, the value of that functions is “the True”, while
anything otherwise is “the False”.
However, in Recanati’s moderate relativist framework, visual expe-
rience has a further layer of content; it also represents a classical propo-
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sition, what Recanati calls the Austinian proposition (2007, p. 6). The
Austinian proposition is what we get when we incorporate all the
parameters of the rich circumstances of evaluation into the representa-
tional content of experience.Thus if, on the one side, my visual expe-
rience of a yellow cube represents incomplete content, namely, a yellow
cube straight ahead, on the other side, it also represents the classical
proposition that there is a yellow cube in my visual field straight ahead
of me at 2 p.m. causally responsible for my visual experience in the actual
world.According to Recanati,
[a]nother line of defense is available to Searle. He may insist that it is
part of the subject’s perceptual experience that that experience is caused by
its object.The ‘causation’ component is not external to the content of
the experience, but an integral part of it.With this I agree – but I do
not think Searle’s position is thereby justified.The subject is aware of
the perceptual nature of his experience: he knows he is perceiving
rather than, say, expecting or imagining. So there is a sense in which
the complete content of his experience is self-referential: but the
‘complete content’ of the experience involves more than the
propositional content – it also involves the psychological mode, of
which the subject is aware and which determines the additional, self-
referential condition. (2007, pp. 133-134)
Arguably, the suggestion that my visual experiences of a yellow cube
straight ahead also represent the object located in my egocentric field, the
time my mental state occurs, the fact that such an object is causally
responsible for my mental state and the world is subject to the same crit-
icism directed by Searle’s account. First, it is cognitively too demanding
to assume that simple creatures like small animals and infants are capable
of knowing or of being aware that they are perceiving rather than
expecting or imaging something.
The way out of this charge is to assume that the mental state repre-
senting the Austinian proposition is nonconceptual in the sense that the
perceiver need not possess the causal, self-referential concepts required to
provide a canonical specification of that Austinian proposition. Never-
theless, even if we accept that visual experience represents Austinian
propositions nonconceptually, we still need to show that such content is
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somehow indispensable to account for behaviors that would otherwise
be left unexplained (SOTERIOU, 2000, p. 182).
The only sort of behavior that could be accounted for by the
nonconceptual Austinian contents is disagreement. Frege is famous for
having argued that the object of agreement and disagreement are classi-
cal propositions. Suppose I say that there is a yellow cube straight ahead
and you disagree. Now, if what we both represent is only the incomplete
content that there is a yellow cube straight ahead, there is no possibility
of a real disagreement between us unless we are in the same epistemic
situation.The content of my visual experience is true of the yellow cube
in my visual field straight ahead of me at the time my experience occurs
and that is causally responsible for my experience. On the other hand, the
content of your experience is true of the yellow cube that is in your visu-
al field straight ahead of you at the time your experience occurs and that
is causally responsible for your experience. By representing the relativis-
tic incomplete content indicated, we can only disagree if we are in the
same epistemic situation, which must be characterized as follows: there is
something in our visual field straight ahead of each of us at the time our
mental states occur that is causally responsible for our mental states. I
believe that this thing is a yellow cube and you disagree. However, if what
we represent is the relativistic incomplete content and, further, if we are
not in the same epistemic situation, there can be no real disagreement
between us, but only misunderstanding. I am talking about something
that is true of my epistemic situation, and you are talking about some-
thing that is true of your epistemic situation. Or so the argument goes.
The ascription of complete Austinian contents serves the purpose of
explaining the disagreement over contents of visual experience when the
contenders are not in the same situation. If the contenders are not in the
same epistemic situation, they can only disagree over an Austinian
content (arising by the incorporation of the mentioned parameters into
the relativistic incomplete content of experience). However, even if we
accept Frege’s assumption that only classical propositions cab be objects
of agreement and disagreement, we can only disagree over the content of
some visual experience when we speak, judge, or think about it.At the
nonconceptual level of perceiving a yellow cube straight ahead, there is
no sense to talk about agreement and disagreement. Thus, there is no
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point in assuming that perceivers represent Austinian propositions in
addition to relativistic incomplete contents.
A second reason to reject Recanati’s moderate relativism arises if one
accepts one of the most popular theories of the phenomenal character in
philosophy of the mind today, namely, intentionalism.According to this
view, either the phenomenal character of experience supervenes the
representational content of that experience (weak intentionalism), or the
two are identical (strong intentionalism). Thus, (i) assuming that the
representational content of visual experience determines the phenome-
nal character of that experience (intentionalism), and further, (ii) that
visual experiences, imagination, and episodic memories represent differ-
ent classical propositions, one cannot accommodate the intuition that at
least some visual experiences, imaginations, and memories have the same
phenomenal character.
Intuitively, though, some episodic memories, imaginations, and visual
experiences of a yellow cube straight ahead have the same phenomenal
character (what can be accounted for in terms of the fact that they repre-
sent an incomplete existential content, viz., the property of being a
yellow cube straight ahead). However, that could not be the case if, under
the intentionalist assumption, the phenomenal character of visual expe-
rience is determined by a further layer of content representing a classical
proposition resulting from the incorporation of the parameters of the
circumstances of evaluation into the incomplete content.
Solving the problems
Soteriou summarizes his argument against the generality thesis (the exis-
tentialist view) as follows:
(i) Those who accept an intentional account of experience should
say that when s subject misperceived the world, the subject is having an
experience with an intentional content that is non-veridical.
(ii) If one rejects Searle’s assumption that the question of the
veridicality of an experience cannot be settled independently of the
question of whether an object is being perceived, one allows for the
possibility of veridical misperception.
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(iii) Given (i) and (ii), the intentionalist should accept Searle’s
assumption.
(iv) If one accepts Searle’s assumption and also accepts the generality
thesis, then one will have to accept that all visual experiences represent
a causal relation between an object and the experience itself.
(v) Searle’s account of the content of experience should be rejected.
Therefore,
(vi) The intentionalist should reject the generality thesis. (2000, p. 184)
The crucial premise in Soteriou’s argument is the conditional (iv),
according to which if one accepts Searle’s assumption and the generality
thesis (existentialist view), one has to accept the controversial further
assumption that the causal relation is represented by visual experience (an
assumption that must be rejected).
However, as we saw, we do not need to accept Searle’s entire set of
ideas in order to accept Searle’s assumption.We may accept that the ques-
tion of the veridicality of an experience cannot be settled independently
of the question of whether an object is being perceived (not allowing for
the possibility of veridical misperception), and we may also accept the
generality thesis that the content of experience is existential (not speci-
fied using singular terms as demonstratives) without having to assume
that the causal relation is always represented by visual experience.All we
need to evade Soteriou’s argument is to assume that the content of expe-
rience takes the form of relativized content, neither veridical nor falsidical
per se, formally modeled as a function from the sextuple of object, agent,
time, location, causal relation, and world to truth-values. In this way, the
causal relation belongs to the circumstance of evaluation of that content
rather than to the content itself.
Now, we also have a natural solution to the particularity problem. My
visual experience represents only the existential proposition that there is
a yellow cube straight ahead. Even though (i) the object, (ii) its location
in my visual field, (iii) the time my experience occurs, (iv) myself as the
agent, (v) the fact that such an object is causally responsible for my
mental state, and (vi) the world does not belong to the content itself, the
accuracy condition of my experience is sensitive to all these parameters.
As a function from the sextuple of object, agent, time, location, causal
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relation, and world to truth-values, the value of that function is True only
when the object is the yellow cube, the time is the time my experience
occurs, the location of the cube in my visual field is straight ahead of me,
and the cube is causally responsible for my experience and the world is
the actual world. In other words, to count as a visual experience, that
representational content can only be true if the particular object, which, being
in my visual field, is straight ahead of me at the time my mental state occurs, is
causally responsible for my mental state.
To the extent that neither the perceiver nor the time her experience
occurs, nor the location of the object in my visual field, nor the causal
relation, nor the world belong to the content, the content is purely
general rather than partly singular. Moreover, the proposed reference of
visual experience to particular objects is not mediated any more by the
perceiver’s knowledge that the particular satisfies the identifying condi-
tion of being located in the perceiver’s egocentric visual field at the time
the mental state occurs and being causally responsible for the mental
state. Here, the reference is de re – that is, determined relationally by the
blind fact that the object satisfies that identifying condition – rather than
de dicto – that is, determined satisfactionally by the perceiver’s knowledge
that the particular object satisfies that condition. Consequently, what
determines the reference of my mental state to the yellow cube is not my
knowledge that the object causes my visual experience, but rather the blind
fact that the object causes my visual experience.
The proposal also explains away the cases of veridical misperceptions
and veridical hallucinations.According to Searle’s assumption, those cases
are cases of sheer illusory experiences. If a mental state represents a
yellow cube straight ahead, but that yellow cube is not in the perceiver’s
visual field at the time the mental state occurs and is not causally respon-
sible for that mental state, that state cannot count as a visual experience
even if there happens to be a yellow cube straight ahead of the perceiver.
As we saw, for a mental state whose relativized content is the property of
being a yellow cube straight ahead to count as a visual experience, it must
be caused appropriately by the object that, in the visual field, is straight
ahead of the perceiver at the time and place her mental state occurs.
Now, the existentialist view must contest a final objection.According
to Tye,
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[a] third difficulty is that if deviant causal chain counter-examples are
to be avoided, it will have to be stipulated that the relevant causal chain
is not deviant. But the conditions needed to spell out non-deviance are
surely not ones that are perceptually available. (2009, p.80)
All we need to avoid the deviant causal chain is to appeal to Fodor’s
asymmetric dependence thesis. Cases in which there is a deviant causal
chain between the visual experience and what it represents are ontolog-
ically dependent on the cases where there is a normal, non-deviant
causal chain, but not the other way around. In other words, there is an
asymmetry of dependence between the normal cases in which my visu-
al experience is caused by the yellow cube in my visual field straight
ahead of me and the deviant cases in which the same experience type is
cause by something else. The first can subsist independently of the
second, but the second can occur only because of the existence of the
first. Now, nothing of this must be “perceptually available,” because these
parameters belong to the rich circumstances of evaluation rather than to
the content itself.
1 Interestingly,Tye offers a quite different reading of his own example.According to him, in
light of the existentialist view, this visual experience is a veridical or accurate simpliciter.The
existentialist account must be rejected, because “it yields an unequivocal result of veridicality
in certain cases (like this) in which such a result is not warranted” (2009, p. 79-80).
However, only Searle’s causal version of the existentialist view yields an unequivocal result in
this case. Nevertheless, in Searle’s causal account, this experience is not an accurate simpliciter,
but rather an inaccurate simpliciter.We will return to this point in the following sections.
2 Tye’s own singular thesis (when fulfilled) faces the same fate. It also results in unequivocal
inaccuracy in cases of veridical misperception. In the singular view, both the cube I am seeing
and the color property it appears to have are components of a singular, object-involving
proposition represented by my visual experience.Thus, according to the singular thesis, my
visual experience is inaccurate simpliciter, since the cube I see enters into the singular content
of my experience, but it is white rather than yellow.According to Tye, though,“This does not
seem the right thing to say.After all, it certainly appears to me that there is a yellow cube in
front of me; and there is such a cube.The world is as it appears in this respect” (2009, p. 83).
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